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11 Introduction
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) de￿ne the in￿ation targeting as a framework of monetary policy
characterized by:
1. Public announcement of an o￿cial quantitative objective for the rate of in￿ation over one
given period of time.
2. O￿cial announcement to the public that the principal goal of long run of the monetary
policy is a low and stable in￿ation.
3. The responsibilisation of the central bank to reach its objectives.
The in￿ation targeting policy became popular toward 90’s years, since this date several
developed and emergent economies started to adopt this new monetary strategy.
The literature trying to explain the various aspects of the in￿ation targeting is abundant, we
can cite Ben Bernanke et al. (1999), Amato and Gerlach (2002), Truman (2003), Giannoni and
Woodford (2003), Martin et al. (2004), Carare and Stone (2006) and Sanchez-Fung (2008).
Why the countries target in￿ation? The reasons are varied: First, it contain in￿ation and make
it converge towards a target value, second, it increase the credibility of the monetary authorities,
third it anchor in￿ationary anticipations of the economic agents and ensure a stable economic
environment for a constant expansion and ￿nally it eliminate the di￿culties resulting from the
monetary targeting.
2 Degree of Openness and In￿ation Targeting policy
2.1 Degree of Openness and In￿ation
Taking into account a high degree of openness 1 in the emerging markets and the sensitivity of
these economies to the import and export of some goods, the variations of exchange rate can
have very fast e￿ects on in￿ation. Calvo and Reinhart (2001) estimate that the transmission of
exchange rate ￿uctuations to the domestic prices is four times more important in the emerging
markets than in the developed ones. Ho and Mac Caulley (2003) compiled a several empirical
studies undertaken over the period 1980-2000, they showed that the degree of pass-through,
related to an important degree of openness, is higher in the emerging markets.
Nevertheless, we can say that a high degree of openness have some ambiguous e￿ects. On
1the degree of openness is measured by the Ratio: Imports/GDP in Volume, Romer (1993)
2one side, a higher degree of openness means that the economy is strongly in￿uenced by the
transmission of exchange rate variations to prices, which brings us to a positive correlation
between the degree of openness and in￿ation.
But on the other side, by considering the economies adopting in￿ation targeting the continual
search of credibility leads to a weak in￿ation in the most open countries. That can be explained
by the interest of the central bank to minimize the variability of price level, which limits
transmission of exchange rate variations to consumer good’s prices.
Figure 1: Relation between In￿ation and Degree of openness
Source: Wynne et Kersting (2007)
Figure (1) illustrates the negative relation between the degree of openness and the level
of in￿ation. Inspired by Kydland and Prescott’s research (1977), the paper of Romer (1993)
illustrates the relation which binds in￿ation with the degree of openness, it shows according
to an empirical study relating to 114 OECD countries, that in the case of absence of a well
de￿ned monetary policy, a high degree of openness involves important variations in the in￿ation
rate. Whereas in the presence of an explicit monetary rule centered on the control of prices,
Romer (1993) shows that there exists a negative relation between the degree of openness and
the variability of in￿ation.
The aim of this paper is to study, in case of exogenous shocks, the relation between the
degree of openness of the economy and the variable that we should target( CPI In￿ation or
Domestic In￿ation). So, we will try to study the impact of an important degree of economy’s
3openness on key variables such as in￿ation, output gap, exchange rate and interest rate when
we adopt several in￿ation targeting policies. Then, we will check whether the choice of the
variable to be target is in￿uenced by the nature of the exogenous shocks in an open economy,
or not.
2.2 Domestic In￿ation Targeting and CPI In￿ation Targeting: Which
alternative for a small open economy?
The choice of which variable to target has been for a long time discussed in the literature.
The variability of exchange rate can have a direct or an indirect e￿ects on prices through the
change in the price of the imported consumer goods. In the case of small open economies,
dependence towards the rest of the world through the imports, plays a very important rule
to sustain domestic economy. In this case we have a consumption basket largely composed of
imported goods, implying that the degree of openness in￿uences in a remarkable way the price’s
variations. In other words, the more the economy is open towards outside, the more the prices
will be sensitive to a change of exchange rate, leading to more complicated control of in￿ation.
Consequently the central bank face two choice: targeting CPI in￿ation which precisely includes
the degree of openness in a complete way through the imported consumer goods, or targeting
domestic in￿ation which also includes the variations of exchange rate but in an incomplete way
through the price of the intermediate imported goods.
Date of I.T Target Adopted Current Inf Degree
of Openness
Rep Tcheque 1997Q1 CPI excl Indirect Taxes 5.5(+/-1) 0,4
New zealand 1990Q1 CPI excl Indirect Taxes, var￿ Termes of Trade 1//3 0,366
Canada 1991Q1 CPI excl food, Energy and Indirect Taxes 1//3 0,36
United Kingdom 1992Q4 CPI excl Mortgage Interests 2//0 0,324
Finland 1993Q1 CPI Formel 2(+/-1) 0,365
Australia 1993Q2 CPI excl F and V, Petrol, Mortgage Interests 2//3 0,237
Israel 1991Q1 CPI 8//11 0,3
Chile 1999Q3 CPI 2//4 0,29
Source: Guender (2001)
Table 1: In￿ation target adopted in some countries
Table (1) shows us that the policy generally adopted by the developed or emergent economies
is CPI in￿ation targeting which includes at the same time the price of domestic and foreign
goods.
The adoption of CPI in￿ation targeting is always prefered by the monetary authorities com-
pared to domestic in￿ation targeting policy, the reason comes from the stabilising caracteristics
4of the CPI in￿ation targeting policy. This is due to the nature of this monetary rule which
takes into account the degree of economy’s openness, consequently with a control of exchange
rate variations, we have a less important volatility of key economic variables such as output
gap, real exchange rate and nominal interest rate 2.
Nevertheless, Svensson (2000) ￿nd that a strict CPI in￿ation targeting uses the direct channel
of exchange rate to stabilize short-term CPI in￿ation, involving important ￿uctuations of real
exchange rate, nominal interest rate and terms of trade.
We also ￿nd some partisans of domestic in￿ation targeting policy, Conway et al. (1999) stress
that the domestic in￿ation targeting does not include the direct e￿ects of exchange rate vari-
ations, involving a reduction in the variability of real output, nominal interest rate, foreign
exchange rate and domestic price. Gali and Monacelli (1999) and Clarida et al. (2001) suggest
also that an optimal monetary policy must be focused on domestic in￿ation. But on another
side, Adolfson (2001), McCallum and Nelson (2001) show that an optimal monetary policy must
be centered on CPI in￿ation. Inspired by this divergence of opinion evoked in the literature,
we try throughout this paper to explain the monetary authoritie’s choice of policy that should
be adopted.
The goal of this paper will be ￿rst, to formulate a NK model applied to a small open
economy and to use it in order to study the macroeconomic characteristics of the adoption of
di￿erents in￿ation targeting policies. Finally, we will try to study which in￿ation targeting rule
would be optimal, in terms of social welfare.
Our article will be organized as follows: in the ￿rst part, we will present our model with
microeconomic fundations which includes a representative household, a ￿rm, a government
and a monetary authority. In a second part, we will try to solve the model with the method
of Blanchard and kahn (1980), by considering the case of Chile as an example of small open
economy. And ￿nally, in the last part we will report our results and our conclusion.
3 The Model
Our model presents an adaptation of a Neo-Keynesian model applied to a small open economy.
The starting point of our analysis is a model with stochastic growth which includes monopolistic
competition and nominal prices rigidity, Calvo(1983). The adoption of price rigidity model
allows to have more important dynamic e￿ects of the monetary policy than a model with
2Guender (2001)
5￿exibles prices, commonly used in modeling of a small open economies.
The model describes the worldwide economy as a set of small open economies of which the
number is normalized to 1. Each economy has a negligible size and thus cannot in￿uence
the rest of the world, these economies share the same preferences, technologies and markets
structures.
First,we focus on study of consumers and producers behavior in one of these economies
considering several in￿ation targeting rules. But before starting our analysis, we make a short
remark on the notation we adopt throught this article. Our interest focus on the study of a
small open economy and its interaction with the rest of the world, therefore the not indexed
variables will refer to the modelled economy. The other variables indexed by i 2 [0:1] refer to
one of the economies which constitute the rest of the world and ￿nally the variables with an
asterisk correspond to the rest of the whole world.
The modelled economy is represented by a central bank, a tax authority which is the gov-
ernment, a representative consumer and a competitive producer. Time is considered as discret.
3.1 Households
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with; 0 <  < 1 is the discount rate, Ct(k;j) consumption of consumer k for good j,   the
frishien elasticity and Lt(k;j) the labor provide by the consumer k to produce a goodj.
The budget constraint of an individual household is given by;
PtCt + Gt;t+1Bt+1 = (1   )WtLt + Bt + TRt; (2)
with Bt+1 is the repayment of the period t+1 for debts contracted at the period t, Wt is
the nominal wage, TRt is transfer of the gouvernment, Gt;t+1 = (1 + it) 1 is the factor of
actualization between the period t and the period t+1 and  is the wage’s tax imposed by the
gouvernment.
In order to maximize his utility the representative consumer chooses to optimize his con-
6sumption Ct and the quantity of labor Lt under the budget constraint formulated by the


















The expression (3) represents the Euler equation for consumption whereas the expression
(4) corresponds to the Euler equation for labor. The index of total consumption Ct is de￿ned
by;








with  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic goods and the foreign goods
and 
 corresponds to the proportion of the domestic consumption allocated to the imported
goods.







with; j 2 [0:1] indicates the variety of the consumed good. 3







with; Ci;t is the index of the quantity of goods imported of countries i and consumed by the







3Each economy produces a continuum of di￿erentiated good represented by the unit interval
7with  is the elasticity of substitution between the various varieties of the goods in the same
economy and  the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the di￿erent foreign
economies.
The optimal allocation for the various goods allows us to deduce the demand functions for





 CH;t Ci;t(j) = [
Pi;t(j)
Pi;t ] Ci;t;
for all i;j 2 [0:1], with PH;t = (
R 1
0 PH;t(j)1 dj)1=1  is the domestic price index and Pi;t =
(
R 1
0 Pi;t(j)1 )1=1  is the price index of the imported goods of country i expressed in domestic
currency.










i;t di)1=1  is the price index of the imported goods expressed
in domestic currency.
Taking the equation (5), we have the optimal allocation for the various goods,




















F;t ]1=(1 ) is the total consumption price index (CPI).
3.2 Firms
We suppose a ￿xed number of ￿rms with monopolistic competition held by the households,
their number is standardized to 1. Each ￿rm produces a di￿erentiated good and use the same
technology. The production requires one factor of production which is labor,
8Yt(j) = ZtLt(j); (8)
with Zt represent an exogenous factor of technology, and Lt(j) is the quantity of labor used to
produce a good j.
The model include price rigidity as in Calvo (1983) we suppose that only a fraction of ￿rms
is authorized to adjust its prices each period. For this period, each ￿rm is face to the probability
(1 ) correspondent to the adjustment of his price, independently of the last period in which
the ￿rm has adjusted its price.
we note P H;t(j) the ￿xed price by the ￿rm at the period t, under the assumption of Calvo
(1983), PH;t+k(j) = P H;t(j) with a probability kpour k=0.1.2... .






















with  is the probability that the producing consumer maintains the same price of the
previous period and MCn
t =
(1 )wt
Zt is the nominal marginal cost 4.
The problem of the producer will be to ￿nd the price P H;t(j) which maximizes the pro￿t
function(10) under demand constraint(9).









t+k)g = 0; (11)
from where we deduce the expression of the optimal price (in log) for a representative ￿rm
which adjusts his price at the period t,




kEtf ^ mct+k + pH;tg; (12)
with pH;t is (log) domestic price,  = log( 
 1) corresponds to (log) of the mark-up at the
4Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy, Monacelli (2005)
9stationary state and ^ mct+1 is (log) of the marginal cost at the stationary state.
Equation (12) shows us that the decision of ￿xing prices is Forward-Looking. The reason
is that the ￿rms at the time when they adjust their prices suppose that this price will be valid
during a given number of period and thus they adjust it like a mark-up of anticipated marginal
cost’s average and not only current marginal cost.
3.3 Government
We suppose that the government adjust its budget each period. The budget constraint of the
government is given by:
PH;tYH;t   TRt = 0: (13)
This equation shows that the transfer of the gvernment equalizes the domestic income on
which we applies a tax rate , this latter eliminates the distortions on the market related to
the monopolistic power of the ￿rms (Flexible prices equilibrum and rigid prices equilibrum ).
3.4 Relation between Domestic and Foreign Prices
3.4.1 Price level and Terms of Trade
Before beginning our analysis of equilibrum, we introduce certain de￿nitions:
we de￿ne the term of trade between the domestic economy and country i by: Si;t =
Pi;t
PH;t. The
e￿ective term of trade will be noted St =
PF;t
PH;t, the log linearization of this equation gives us
st = logSt = pF;t pH;t. While replacing in the expression of the price index Pt, there we obtain
a linearized expression of the price level CPI:
pt = (1   
)pH;t + 
pF;t = pH;t + 
st: (14)
Thus, we can de￿ne the log of CPI in￿ation,
t = (1   
)H;t + 
F;t: (15)
It follows from this expression,
t = H;t + 
4st: (16)
10with H;t = pH;t   pH;t 1 is the domestic in￿ation and F;t = pF;t   pF;t 1 is the foreign
in￿ation.
The equation (16) link the two measure of in￿ation (Domestic and CPI) through the terms
of trade and the coe￿cient 
 which de￿ne the degree of economy’s openness.
3.5 Financial Market
we suppose in this article that the international ￿nancial markets are complete. 5. This impor-
tant assumption enables us to say that in such a case we don’t need an international diversi-
￿cation of our portfolio, therefore the transitory shocks do not have permanent consequences,
which simpli￿es considerably our analysis.

















] = Gt;t+1; (17)
with Ei;t is nominal exchange rate between the domestic economy and country i.






with Qi;t = Ei;tP i





is a constant term. We will
suppose for the rest of this article that we have an identical environment and thus we don’t have
to hold foreign assets, therefore  = 1. The assumption of complete markets 6 is translated
through the equation (18), which associates domestic and foreign consumption with the real
exchange rate.

















5Cole (1991), Monacelli (1999)
6The assumption of complete market has the advantage of eliminating foreign assets movements of the
dynamics of economy. As a result, the stationary state is unique considering consumption independent of the
last shocks. From where, the model can be linearized around a single stationary state, that not being possible
with other standard models of the small open economies.
113.5.1 Uncovered Interest Parity
Under the assumption of a complete ￿nancial market, the domestic price of a foreign good is




with Gt;t+1 = 1
1+it is the factor of actualization for period t+1. We take a linear form of the
preceding expression and agregate it on the whole of small economies i, we ￿nd the expression
of uncovered interest parity:
it   i

t = Etfet+1g   et: (21)
4 Aggregation of the Model


















and an interest rate rule, it.
Equilibrium on goods and services market
Yt(j) = CH;t(j) +
R 1
0 CH;t(i;j)di














124.1 Model at steady state
We resolve our model by supposing that: Z = 1, PmL = W
P ,PH;t = PF;t = Pt = P 
t = Qt = 1,
 =  = 1, C = Ci = C.
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CH = (1   
)C; CF = 
C
Table 2: Equations at steady state
4.2 Aggregate Demand
The equilibrium on goods and services market, requires a level of production for all j[0:1],
which satis￿es the following condition:

































with; CH;t(i;j) is demand of country i for good j produced in the domestic economy.




























t is the e￿ective term of trade of country i, whereas Si;t is term of trade between the
domestic and the foreign economy. Using the form of the expression (24) at the steady state
we ￿nd:





13with ! =  + (1   
)(   1). An analogical condition for country i allows us to write



















t is the foreign output and c
t is the foreign consumption of the rest of the world.













If we replace the equation of output (25) into the Euler equation of consumption, we obtain
the expression of the aggregate demand:












with:  = (  1)+(1  
)(  1), it is the nominal interest rate, H;t+1 is the domestic
in￿ation at the period t+1 and y
t+1 is the foreign output at the same period.
4.3 Aggregate Supply
Taking the expression of the price obtained by maximization of the pro￿t function of ￿rm, we
obtain the expression of domestic in￿ation which represent a formulation of the Phillips curve
of new Keynesian (NKPC):




 + z) , =
(1 )(1 )
 and xt = yt   yflex is the output gap which is the
di￿erence between the domestic output yt and the output obtained at ￿exible price equilibrum
yflex.
At this stage, we notice that the degree of openness of the economy 
 a￿ects the dynamics of
in￿ation through the slope of Philips curve in other term through its impact on output gap.





14a phillips curve for CPI in￿ation:
t = EtfH;t+1g + k
xt + 
(st   st 1): (30)
4.4 Monetary Policy
We consider a simple Taylor rule according to which the central bank adjust nominal interest
rate in response to anticipated in￿ation and delayed interest rate. Svensson (1997) considers
that the monetary authorities when they target in￿ation, they always have an even implicit
target of production. Our choice for a simple policy of Taylor, which includes in￿ation and
interest rate, implicitly includes an adjustment of output through the expression of aggregate
supply presented more in details in the previous part. The monetary policy is given, then, by
the following expression:
it = it 1 + (1   )(Et[t+1]   ) + t; (31)
with: i is the degree of smoothing of interest rate, it 1 is delayed nominal interest rate
and  is the in￿ation target ￿xed by the central bank. The selected monetary rule will vary
according to the variable of in￿ation which the central bank seeks to target, then we have two
types of monetary rules:
 CPI in￿ation targeting policy :
it = it 1 + (1   )(Et[t+1]   ) + t; (32)
 Domestic in￿ation targeting policy :
it = it 1 + (1   )(Et[H;t+1]   ) + t: (33)
For the rest of this paper we take as a reference the framework of Gali and Monacelli
(2005), we suppose that the domestic in￿ation targeting policy guarantee at the same time a
stabilization of domestic price level and output gap . This result is con￿rmed by Rotemberg and
Woodford’s resarch (1999) which suppose that if there are a transfer ratio of the government
 which is constant, that makes it possible to counterbalance the distortions associated with
the monoplistic power of ￿rms on the market and consequently these ￿rms will adjust price
by considering the case of equilibrum at ￿exible price. While adopting a domestic in￿ation
15targeting policy, prices of domestic goods will be consequently constant, which involves that
the real marginal costs equalize the reverse of the mark-up 8. The intuition is that by ￿xing
the mark-up and thus the marginal cost at their ￿exibles price equilibrum, the ￿rm do not may
￿nd it bene￿cial any more to adjust their prices and thus the domestic prices remain constant
9.
With ￿exible prices, the relation between the output gap xt and the marginal cost ^ mct is
formulated as follows 10:
^ mct = (  + 
)xt
When the marginal cost is stabilized on its equilibrum level, the expression combined above
with equation (29) of the model shows that the output gap will be consequently constant, Gali
(2003).
5 Social Welfare
In order to evaluate the social welfare while considering the two policies of in￿ation targeting,
we have recourse to approximate the second order of utility function of consumer. The social
loss then will be dependant on deviation of in￿ation and deviation of output compared to
its stationary state. We refere as a starting point to Gali(2007) and Beningo and Woodford
(2005)’s works , we derive the function of social loss from utility of the representative agent,













t + (1 + )x
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t] (34)
we consider now the unconditional anticipations of the equation (34) and we suppose that









var(t) + (1 + )var(xt)] (35)
8we suppose that in ￿exible price equilibrum, the marginal cost (log) equalizes the reverse of the mark-up(log);
^ mct =   =  log( 
 1)
9Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Gali (2003)
10For more details, see Appendix-A
16The analysis of the criteria of social welfare will be done according to three cases, the ￿rst
will be our situation of reference 
0, then we will see the e￿ect of a variation of this degree
of openness, 
1 and 
2, on the social loss variation, considering the two alternatives in￿ation
targeting rules.
6 Resolution and Calibration of the Model
6.1 Method of Resolution of the Model
The resolution of the model is carried out by the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) which
is a method of resolution of linear systems. In matric form, our system can be written:
Et [kt+1] = Akt + Bvt
with kt is the vector of endogenous variables, A and B are the matrix of coe￿cients and vt is
the matrix containing the variables of shock.
Blanchard and Kahn stipulate that if the number of the eigenvalues of matrix A, smaller
than 1, is equal to the number of predicated variables, in our case 2 variable: it 1 and st 1, and
that the number of the eigenvalues of this same matrix, higher than 1, equal to the number of
the variables anticipated, in our case 3 variables: Ct+1, t+1 and H;t+1, then we can determine
a single and steady state for our matrix system.
6.2 Calibration
The choice of the variables of calibration for Chile, is based on standard values used in the
literature. The choice for Chile is du to the fact that this small open economy is considered as
one of the emergents economies which succeeded its in￿ation targeting policy in comparison to
the other countries. In spite of its in￿ationary past, Chile could reach very low levels of in￿ation
during very short time by ensuring a great credibility of its monetary policy. Its dependence on
outside did not prevent it to keep stable its level of in￿ation and from thus ensuring the good



















Table 3: Parameters of Calibration
The discount factor is  = 0:99. The degree of openness of the economy or the proportion
of the domestic consumption allocated to the imported goods is measured by the ratio of the
imports to the GDP over the period 1998-2000, [Parrado (2004)]. This parameter will be in a
￿rst case of reference equal to 
0 = 0:29 then we vary it, 
1 = 0:2 and 
2 = 0:6, in order to see
the e￿ect of an increase in the degree of openness on the choice of the monetary policy.
This economy who is open toward outside is caracterised by an elasticity of substitution between
the domestic goods and the foreign goods equal to  = 1:5.
The elasticity of substitution between the various varieties of goods in the same economy
is  = 4:33 [Parrado (2004)], which implies a mark-up at the stationary state  = 26%   27%.
According to [Moyen and Sahuc (2008)], the reverse of Frishienne elasticity is   = 0:63.
The parameter responsible of the nominal rigidity of the prices is  = 0:75 for Chile, which
corresponds to only one annual adjustment of the prices.
Finally, the parameters of the interest rate rule and the autoregression process of the exogenous
shocks are i = 0:8, Z = 0:8 and yFo = 0:8.
7 Results
The simulation of our model gives us the following results, we start by using the parameters of
Chile without bringing any modi￿cation , then we modify the parameter 
 which re￿ects the
degree of openness of the Chilean economy and we study the impulse response which we will
have following the exogenous shocks.
187.1 CPI In￿ation Targeting
We suppose ￿rst, that the Chilean monetary authorities target the CPI in￿ation which includes
at the same time domestic in￿ation and imported in￿ation through the foreign consumer goods.
7.1.1 Productivity shock
The simulation of our model gives us the following graphs which illustrate the impulse response
of di￿erent variables, following a shock of productivity: CPI in￿ation, Domestic in￿ation,
Output gap, Nominal interest rate, Real exchange rate, Terms of exchange, CPI price level and
Domestic price level.
Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a shock of Productivity
The major goal of the monetary authorities when they adopt a CPI in￿ation targeting policy
is to stabilize the CPI price level as well as the level of corresponding in￿ation.
Following a positive shock of productivity of 1 %, domestic in￿ation varies but in a small
proportion, whereas CPI in￿ation remains constant. The improvement of the productivity
involves a persistent reduction in the nominal interest rate which will in￿uence favorably the
consumption and the output. The ￿gure (2) shows us that on the one hand the increase
in domestic in￿ation involves a real appreciation whereas on the other hand, the fall of the
19domestic price level involves an increase in the terms of trade.
By increasing 
1 > 
0, we notice that the adjustment of the variables is modi￿ed. Although CPI
in￿ation remained constant when we consider the CPI in￿ation targeting, the other variables
became much more volatile in comparison with the situation of reference 
0. The variability
of the degree of openness in￿uences the aggregate supply, a modi￿cation of 
 a￿ect the slope
of the curve through the output gap, which according to the equation (29) of the model implie
a fall of the output gap, which generates consequently a contractionnary monetary policy that
increase the interest rate.
A more important openness degree results in an increase in the imports of the foreign goods
what causes an improvement in the demand of imported goods and consequently a fall in the
reciprocal demand for domestic goods, which makes them less competitive for the consumers.
The equation (16) which connects two measurements of in￿ation through the terms of trade,
shows us that an increase in the degree of openness, involves a fall of domestic in￿ation. This
e￿ect is still con￿rmed, the raise in prices of the domestic goods involves a fall of the terms of
trade, which implies a real appreciation of domestic currency (Equation (14)).
At this stage we can underline, that according to the impulse response of the various variables,
we note that the increase in the degree of economy openness involves a greater variability
translated through nominal interest rate, the terms of trade and real exchange rate.
7.1.2 Foreign GDP Shock
A shock on foreign variables generally have a very important impact by considering the small
open economies, considering in most case that economies are very dependant on outside. So a
variation of the foreign GDP is quickly transmitted on the national aggregates.
The impulse response of the ￿gure (3) are a little di￿erent from those which preceding. An
improvement of the foreign GDP of 1 % involves a rise in the domestic in￿ation accompanied
by a stable level of CPI in￿ation and corresponding price level, this result is foreseeable con-
sidering the monetary policy adopted by the central bank which is the CPI in￿ation targeting.
Following an increase in the supply of foreign goods, the monetary authorities will adopt an
expansionnary monetary policy by lowering nominal interest rate in order to support the do-
mestic output, which generates a positive output gap, which means that the level of production
will be higher than the level in equilibrum state.
On another side, the fall of the domestic price level involves an increase in the terms of trade
combined with an increase in real exchange rate explaining by the raise of domestic in￿ation.
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This increase in exchange rate involves a depreciation of the domestic currency encouraging
exports and dissuading the imports.
This e￿ect is ampli￿ed by increasing the degree of openness, the volatility of the variables
increases in a very important way. The output gap, the terms of trade and the real exchange
rate reach a volatility of 5 %. This important volatility is due to the increase in the demand of
foreign goods which initially a￿ect the price of the imported goods and considering the increase
of 
, will modify the composition of CPI price level in favor of imported goods.
We could conclude at this level that a foreign GDP shock allows to an increase of the proportion
of imported goods in the domestic consumption basket increasing the degree of Pass-Through
towards domestic goods prices, which induces a greater volatility of economic variables, in spite
of CPI in￿ation targeting.
7.2 Domestic In￿ation Targeting
We applie in this part the same model but we suppose this time that the monetary authorities
of Chile adopt a policy of domestic in￿ation targeting.
217.2.1 Productivity Shock
We start by applying a shock of productivity by distinguishing between our situation of reference

0 and the adjusted situation 
1 > 
0.
Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a shock of Productivity
Considering a domestic in￿ation targeting, the adjustment pro￿le of the variables is a little
bit modi￿ed. The goal of monetary authorities, in this case, will be to stabilize the domestic
corresponding in￿ation and price level.
The level of the output gap is constant by considering the rule of domestic in￿ation targeting,
which con￿rms the results of Gali and Monacelli (2005).
We notices a drop in the level of nominal interest rate, thus it involve implicitly an increase
of consumption and output. This increase in output is not re￿ected through the output gap
which remains constant following the shock, that is due to the fact that by adopting a target
of domestic in￿ation, the central bank leads an implicit target of output gap and then tends to
bring closer the level of domestic production of the level of equilibrum of long run, [Svensson
(1997)].
Following a positive shock of productivity, the parity of interest rate can be presented as an
explanation of the reaction of real exchange rate, . The fall of nominal interest rate involves a
22depreciation of the national currency and thus increases exports what explains in its turn the
rise of the production.
Gali and Monacelli (2005) still underline, that in the event of domestic in￿ation targeting, a
depreciation of the national currency, due to a shock of productivity, involves an increase in
CPI in￿ation.
By increasing the degree of openness of the economy, we can say that the adjustment of the
variables is made in the same manner but we notice an important volatility compared to the
situation of reference. Nevertheless, this idea is not valid for real exchange rate, the terms of
trades and nominal interest rate. The explanation is simple, when we consider a domestic in-
￿ation targeting policy, a variation of 
 lead to a variation of CPI in￿ation without in￿uencing
the level of terms of trade.
We notice that the level of real exchange rate will drop on a level lower than in the case of

0. Finally, the stability of output gap, even with an increase of 
 makes interest rate nominal
insensitive to this variation of the degree of openness.
We can conclude that when we consider a shock of productivity, we notice that by comparing
the volatility of variables with two di￿erent targeting monetary rules, we can stress that the
degree of transmission of the exogenous variations is more important with a domestic in￿ation
targeting policy. In addition, with a CPI in￿ation targeting policy, we ￿nd that the Pass-
Through is less important and thus the reaction of the variables to an increase of 
, is less
marked with a volatility on average not exceeding 0.5 %, [Flamini (2007)].
7.2.2 Foreign GDP Shock
We present in this part the impulse response of Chile with a domestic in￿ation targeting policy
to a shock of foreign GDP. We compare, as mentioned above, a ￿rst case 
0 to a second case
in which we have 
1 > 
0.
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We ￿nd a constant level of domestic level of in￿ation, of output gap and domestic price,
compatible with the objective of the central bank. Nevertheless, when we consider the same
shock of foreign GDP but under the two monetary policies, we ￿nd di￿erent results.
The ￿rst remark that we can notice by comparing the impulse response for an increase in the
foreign GDP, it is that volatility is much less important with a high degree of openness , this
is valid for a domestic in￿ation targeting rule. In fact, when we target domestic in￿ation, the
domestic goods price does not vary and thus the variations of terms of trades are very small.
The stability of the output gap is accompanied with a small variation of interest rate compared
to the situation where we have a monetary rule centered on CPI in￿ation.
We can say at this level, that by considering a foreign shock, the domestic in￿ation targeting
policy o￿ers more stabilizing characteristics for the domestic price level, the level of in￿ation
corresponding and the output gap what, in the event of increase of 
, does not in￿uence in an
important way the behavior of the economic variables.
While referring to the preceding results, we say that when we consider the case of reference 
0,
it is more optimal for Chile to adopt a CPI in￿ation targeting policy in the event of domestic
or foreign shock. Whereas by increasing the degree of openness, the choice of monetary policy
becomes dependant of the nature of the exogenous shock. For a domestic shock such as an
24improvement of the productivity, the optimal rule is the CPI in￿ation targeting, whereas for a
foreign shock such as the increase in the demand of the imported goods the optimal rule would
be the domestic in￿ation targeting.
7.3 Social Welfare
In this part, we try to evaluate the social welfare in case of CPI in￿ation targeting and domestic
in￿ation targeting, by highlighting the impact of the variation in the degree of openness.
CPI In￿ation Targeting Domestic In￿ation Targeting
Productivity shock Foreign GDP shock Productivity shock Foreign GDP shock

0 = 0:29: Baseline
var(In￿ation) 0,0000 0 0,0561 0,0554
var(output) 0,1500 0,1422 0 0
var(Loss) 0,0959 0,0908 1,0047 0,9921

1 = 0:2: Lower openness
var(In￿ation) 0,0000 0 0,0387 0,0382
var(output) 0,1657 0,2766 0 0
var(Loss) 0,1193 0,1992 0,7809 0,7713

2 = 0;6: Upper openness
var(In￿ation) 0,0000 0 0,1188 0,1171
var(output) 0,1857 1,597 0 0
var(Loss) 0,0669 0,5749 1,1988 1,1816
Table 4: Variance Analysis of Social Welfare
Table (4) report the results of variance analysis for the welfare loss function associated with
two monetary policies of in￿ation targeting, these results are gathered in three groups each
one treat a particular case. In the ￿rst case we take as reference 
0 = 0:29, we ￿nd that for
a CPI in￿ation targeting, the variance of CPI in￿ation is equal to zero, which is explained
by the adopted policy, whereas with a domestic in￿ation targeting policy, the variance of CPI
in￿ation become signi￿cant. Nevertheless when we target the domestic in￿ation, the situation
is reversed for the output gap, the variance becames near to zero, which con￿rmed by Gali
and Monacelli (2005). The loss in social welfare however is much important by considering
this monetary policy. For the second case 
1 < 
0, we notice that the variability of output
gap increases as well as the degree of social loss. This remark is reversed by considering the
domestic in￿ation targeting policy, more the degree of openness is lower, more the loss in social
25welfare as well as the variance of in￿ation decrease. In the last case 
2 > 
0, we notice that
for a CPI in￿ation targeting policy, the variance of the social loss evolves in opposite direction
with the degree of openness, whereas the output varies in the same direction as the openness of
the economy. For 
2 = 0:6, the variance of the social loss is equal to 0.0669 against a variance
equal to 0.1193 for 
1 = 0:2. Whereas, the output variance for 
2 is equal to 0.1857 compared
to 0.1657 for 
1 = 0:2. The situation is reversed by considering the domestic in￿ation targeting
policy.
We conclude that an open economy may ￿nd bene￿cial to adopt a CPI in￿ation targeting policy
because it o￿ers a more important pro￿t in social welfare, by minimizing the variance of the
social loss function and CPI in￿ation.
8 Conclusion
We tried throught this paper to study the impact of a high degree of openness on the choice
of the in￿ation targeting policy which should be adopted by the central bank. We applied a
neo-keynesian model caracterised by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition, we take
the case of Chile as a reference. We ￿nd on the one hand that there is a signi￿cant di￿erence
in the impulse response when we consider the two in￿ation targeting policies (Domestic and
CPI in￿ation targeting). And in the other hand, there is a link between the adopted monetary
policy and the nature of the exogenous shocks. By taking the case of reference 
0 in which
we did not modify the Chile’s parameters, we ￿nd that the optimal policy adopted by the
monetary authorities would be the CPI in￿ation targeting, which includes at the same time
the variations of the domestic prices and the variations of foreign exchange rate, this result is
valid by considering a domestic or a foreign shock. Now, when we consider the case where we
modi￿e the degree of openness of the economy 
1 > 
0, the choice of the optimal policy becomes
dependant on the nature of the exogenous shock. With a positive shock of productivity, we
notice that the degree of Pass-Through towards the economy is controlled much more with a
CPI in￿ation targeting policy than with a domestic in￿ation targeting one. Whereas, while
considering a foreign GDP shock, the choice of a rule centered on domestic in￿ation becomes
more optimal because it ensures at the same time a stability of the domestic goods price level,
corresponding in￿ation and the output gap level.
By considering the criteria of social welfare, we conclude that the increase in the degree of
openness of the economy allows pro￿ts in social welfare when we consider a CPI in￿ation
targeting.
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